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SYMPOSIUM:
THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST
Preface
On February 26-27, 1999, Vanderbilt University Law School
and the student-edited Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
hosted a symposium entitled "The International Trust." The
articles appearing in this issue and the next issue of the Journal
are the product of that symposium. The Symposium, as well as
this and the next issue of the Journal, represent an attempt to
give serious consideration to a topic that to date has received
relatively little serious examination.
The international trust, the subject of the Symposium, is
experiencing an extraordinary reception worldwide. It is being
utilized by individuals from countries with legal cultures that
traditionally have not known this form of ownership. In fact,
there is no formal legal construct known as the "international
trust." Rather, the term as used in the Symposium and as used
herein, is intended as an organizing principle to explore the
various implications of trusts with international or transborder
linkages. The focus is on private trusts, those utilized to manage
the wealth of individuals and their families, although much of the
discussion pertains as well to trusts used for business,
commercial, and broad-based mutual and pension funds.
There is a great similarity between the generative conditions
behind international trusts today and the conditions that gave
rise to the trust in the first instance. Used as a vehicle for
bypassing restrictions on clerical ownership of property in
England, the trust soon evolved into an essential and
commonplace means both for wealth management and its
disposition within a family. The trust's tasks are both of a
horizontal and vertical nature. The trust permits private
regulation by the settlor and finite differentiation among
519
HeinOnline  -- 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 519 1999
520 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VoL 32:519
beneficiaries at a particular generational level. It also permits
precise, private control over the administiation of wealth and its
disposition among successive generations across time. The
settlor can be assured that the plan will be effectuated due to the
high duties imposed on the trustee, who serves as a- fiduciary.
This same private managerial and distributive control system that
has traditionally characterized the trust remains much in
demand. The international dimension, however, is increasingly
taking center stage, and actually effecting an evolution in the
trust persona, because of several crucial factors:
1. Increased mobility of capital
Advances in technology have now eliminated delays in the
deployment and redeployment of investment capital worldwide.
Technology has also afforded access to immediate information
worldwide regarding economic and political conditions. These
developments have substantially reduced risk in connection with
long-distance capital deployment and have enhanced the ability
of the investor to seek globally the most efficient market for his
capital.
In addition to the rise of global portfolios, the barriers that
previously existed in terms of currency exchange and capital
export controls have largely fallen. Thus, far fewer restrictions
limit the investor's ability to take advantage of promising
investments in other parts of the world.
The potential for the free outflow of capital to the most
competitive markets has also exercised an impact in fostering the
deregulation of imported capital. Previous concerns regarding
foreign economic imperialism have become less defensible in view
of the intense competition for capital. Countries must now
compete to retain capital as well as to attract new capital.
In this new environment, a settlor in Europe or South
America can transfer assets electronically to a trustee in the
Cayman Islands. The trustee can obtain real-time information
from New York and Hong Kong. On the basis of that information,
the trustee can proceed to make investment allocation decisions
and then effect these decisions in an instant.
2. The rise of the geographically extended family
The collapse worldwide of investment barriers and the
correlative development of technologies that facilitate universal
investment strategies also exert pressure in favor of the
worldwide free flow of labor. This is especially true among the
highly educated and those proficient in much-needed technical
skills. Immigration and visa restrictions have, of necessity,
become less rigid. High-level executives spend considerable time
in other jurisdictions and develop enduring ties. Concomitantly,
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traditional national, racial, religious, and social constraints
regarding marriage and family formation are falling. Persons with
ties to and family capital in more than one country join together
and intertwine their economic interests. Members of families
seek out the best educational and employment opportunities,
wherever they may be located. This worldwide education and
labor market tends both to create multinational families and to
spread out families, not unlike the great mobility experienced
within the United States' "common market7 in the post-World
War II period.
In short, wealth now has to be managed and will be
ultimately distributed in ways that do not respect artificial
political and territorial barriers. Family beneficiaries may live
under multiplicitous legal and taxation systems that diverge from
one another. These systems may also diverge dramatically from
the system under which the original owner lives or lived. They
may also be unlike that of the jurisdiction exercising authority
over the underlying assets.
The territorial incohesion of families and assets can also be
explained in part by the vast, involuntary movements of millions
of refugees during this century. Inevitably, as many of these
persons and their successors have flourished economically in
host countries, they have also renewed ties with persons who
have remained behind. Eventually, capital may be invested
there, using the competitive advantage in terms of information
and contacts that these refugees have.
3. The rise of a universalist culture
The previously discussed developments are also facilitating
the emergence of a cultural outlook that previously typified only a
minute fraction of the population with vast resources. This
universalist outlook regards capital as country-neutral and
deems territorial borders archaic barriers to the maximization of
individual and family wealth. With capital and family dispersed
worldwide, allegiance to any one jurisdiction grows increasingly
tenuous. Domestic government is essentially a problem of public
choice, an additional cost of doing business.
4. The rise of the offshore jurisdiction
The political pursuit of self-determination and human rights
ended colonialism, which contributed to the rise of a slew of mini-
states. A preeminent principle of the post-World War II
international legal order has been respect for national
sovereignty, no matter how artificial the particular sovereign
state. These states belong to the United Nations and other
international organizations. They issue passports, enact internal
laws, control their borders, and fly their own flags.
19991
HeinOnline  -- 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 521 1999
522 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VoL 32:519
Beyond the formal fagade of sovereignty and the enforcement
of a stable system of autonomous nation-states, there thrives an
unregulated bazaar for free capital. Mini-states, with little else to
sustain them, function as filters in the worldwide free flow of
capital. They are way-stations in the passage of capital from one
sovereign country to its redeployment in another sovereign's
territory.
These mini-state intermediaries typically are island nations.
They lie directly offshore the country which is the destination for
freed capital. Alternatively, they can be found offshore the
jurisdiction from which capital has been freed. Once offshore, the
capital becomes essentially untraceable by the source country for
purposes of taxation and other forms of regulation. It is then
invested in the import market, but at favorable rates and
deregulation. The Caribbean island nations and Bermuda perform
this function for the United States. The Channel Islands perform
the same function for the United Kingdom and Europe.
The offshore jurisdictions, despite incessant onshore
criticism of them, could not thrive without tacit onshore
tolerance, if not active support. An example is the United States.
A major capital-importing country, it has permitted offshore
jurisdictions to draw in capital from other high tax and regulatory
states in Europe and Asia. It has historically afforded massive
tax benefits for foreign investment in an undeniable effort to lure
the capital. Since all residents and citizens of the United States
are taxed on worldwide income, the offshore platform permits
investment in the country without experiencing the full brunt of
federal taxation and with the benefit of certain exclusions
afforded to foreign persons.
Offshore jurisdictions, however, are agnostic. They absorb
capital as well from the same countries in which capital is
invested. This phenomenon is quite evident in the case of the
United States. For example, in response to high-priced tort
recoveries, offshore jurisdictions have marketed trust-related
legal structures that purportedly afford asset protection from
onshore litigants.
5. Enhanced national and state regulatory regimes
The same technology that permits rapid worldwide capital
flows also permits the establishment of more efficient and
effective domestic regulatory regimes. Democratic regimes in
industrialized societies are unpredictable in terms of the precise
levels of taxation and other impositions over time, but, even at
their best, demand substantial amounts for redistributional
purposes. Other state-sanctioned private legal obligations, such
as postmortem spousal and child protection regimes, are also a
standard feature of such systems. Indirect transfers of wealth
HeinOnline  -- 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 522 1999
through a system of largely unrestrained jury-based tort awards
further expose individual capital to significant costs and risks.
This regime of redistribution and regulation spurs an inevitable
and intensifying clash between the sovereign and its benefactors
on the one hand, and the more limited number of high net worth
individuals seeking to preserve and even enhance returns on
their capital on the other hand. Increasingly, the latter
individuals seek to cut costs through the international trust
administered from a jurisdiction with a nonredistributive and
nonregulatory environment.
6. The clash of legal regimes
Whenever capital is invested elsewhere, there is likely to be a
clash of legal regimes. The legal regime of the wealth-owner may
well differ from that of the situs of capital investment. The
ultimate beneficiaries of the wealth-owner's largesse, if not
himself, may be affiliated with and subject to still other legal and
taxation regimes. The perceived need for a single, predictable
governing law is considerable, especially if significant external
costs are to be avoided.
The clash of legal regimes is not exclusively between
countries with completely alien legal traditions. In many
instances, similar regimes with common roots, like that of the
United States and the Commonwealth countries, diverge as well,
although admittedly not to as extreme a degree. Thus, to the
extent the administration of wealth can be brought under a single
system of rules governing the trust, it is likely to be strongly
preferred. The international trust holds out this promise by
centralizing the determination of rights and duties at the situs of
trust administration and through a designated governing law.
The six factors that have been considered above explain the
environment in which the "international trust7 flourishes. They
also help explain its growth and evolution from a purely domestic
instrument for capital management and distribution. As noted,
the trust permits centralized management of worldwide
investments from one geographic locale. Modern technologies
assure that administration from that location does not result in a
palpable competitive disadvantage.
The preferred geographic locale for centralized international
trust administration is one that affords a reliable, stable tax- and
regulatory-free regime. The trustee is offshore and does not
reside at the source. Efforts by the source jurisdiction to obtain
information to determine whether the transferor still retains
substantial economic control over the assets are likely to prove
fruitless. The offshore international trust haven typically
enforces severe confidentiality rules with respect to the trust.
1999] PREFA CE
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Moreover, the investment capital may not be owned by the trust
itself, but rather by a corporation or other entity organized in still
another jurisdiction but controlled directly or through a chain of
ownership by the trustee of the international trust.
In addition to the residence of the trustee abroad, the
original wealth-holder is not likely to remain in his country of
citizenship. In many cases, by shifting residence, he avoids its
taxation and regulatory regimes. This does not mean he will
reside where the trust is administered. The offshore jurisdiction
is not likely to encourage an influx of such persons, destabilizing
its own sensitive political and social structures. Capital, not
people, is being attracted.
The commonplace result is one of the setflor residing in one
country, the trustee administering the trust in a second, and the
beneficiaries residing in a third and fourth, with the underlying
assets scattered all over the world. The situs of the trust is in a
jurisdiction in which the rule of law has long prevailed and where
political stability is guaranteed by proximity to a dominant
capital-importing country like the United States. The fiduciary
principles that lie at the heart of trust law afford the further
guarantee necessary in light of the often substantial physical
distance between interested parties and assets. As a fiduciary,
the trustee faces considerable liability for mismanagement.
Indeed, improper or negligent administration jeopardizes the very
status of the offshore jurisdiction and the wealth it earns as a
capital flow way-station. In an intensely competitive market for
the capital, improper management cannot long be tolerated. Loss
of status is especially threatening, since it could dry up the
predominant source of white-collar employment that assures
local, social and political tranquility in the offshore haven.
The intense competition for capital among offshore
jurisdictions creates a buyer's market. A trust legislation free-for-
all has developed in which there is a race-to-the-bottom, from one
perspective, or a maximization of trust corpus protections, from
another perspective. Thus, legislation shields the trust's assets
from post-transfer onshore creditors. Claims of spouses, children,
and other family members back home to a portion of the wealth in
trust are not accorded recognition, even assuming the wealth can
be located.
The issues concerning the "international trust," however, are
not simply "offshore" issues. In many developed countries that
have not recognized the trust as a distinctive form of ownership
and management of property, the trust is, nevertheless, maling
inroads. Even when constructed on a common law offshore
platform, there may be a deployment of its capital in a civil law,
nontrust environment. If an issue arises as to local control,
taxation, regulation, or rights, how is the trust to be
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characterized? Increasingly, nontrust jurisdictions, as capital
importers, are realizing the need to come to terms with the trust,
either by recognizing it, and/or by actually incorporating it within
its own legal system. They are also having to develop a regime of
taxation by analogy to the taxation of comparable domestic
institutions.
Why has the trust assumed the role described, rather than
that role being assumed by the corporation, which has been far
more widely accepted? There are a number of reasons for this.
Perhaps the principal one is that someone must own the equity of
the corporate entity. It cannot be the original owner, or else he
will face the same problems that led him to look abroad in the
first place. Ultimately, a legal person, distinct from the original
owner and also from the ultimate beneficiaries, is necessary.
With the foregoing background, the significance of the
articles appearing in this issue and the following issue of the
Journal should be apparent. The first topic addressed in the
present issue deals with the divergencies in English and
American trust law. As noted, the trust is a common law concept
with an overlay of statutory enactments. However, the English
and American sources of this law have been far from consistent.
The lack of harmony is not merely a matter of academic interest.
The international trust, as a universal operating system, requires
a single language for maximum efficiency and broad acceptance.
The articles by Professors Edward C. Halbach, Jr. and David
Hayton are essential in this regard. Their dialogue not only
illuminates areas of disharmony, but also reveals the likely
evolution of these two branches of trust law, including the
prospects for harmonization.
With the increasing prominence of the international trust,
the offshore jurisdictions have become a third source for trust law
internationally. They have shown great creativity and
responsiveness to the needs of owners of capital in shaping trust
law legislatively. Still, these jurisdictions are heavily influenced
by the evolution of the law in the United States and the
expectations of capital importers and re-importers there. On the
other hand, the offshore jurisdictions are also heavily steeped in
the process and substance of English law. Thus, the differences
in U.S. and English trust law create real tensions with respect to
the effective administration of international trusts.
The second set of articles deals with U.S. taxation of foreign
trusts. An elaborate structure for U.S. taxation of such trusts
was enacted in 1996 and has been amplified upon by extensive
treasury regulations promulgated on February 2, 1999. The
original purpose of foreign trust tax legislation was to assure that
U.S. taxpayers did not reduce their tax liability by accumulating
income in an offshore trust, thereby deferring income taxation
1999]
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until its repatriation. The more recent law is especially designed
to discourage remaining opportunities, such as the use of
international trusts by nonresident aliens before emigrating to
the United States or to benefit their family members in the United
States.
On the other hand, the new legislation and treasury
regulations may have actually opened up certain opportunities
for foreign trusts that previously did not exist. Specifically, in
seeking to define objectively what is a "foreign trust," the new
legislation draws a bright line that permits structuring trusts so
that they fall on the preferred side of that line.
With considerable acuity, Carlyn S. McCaffrey and Elyse G.
Kirschner explore the maze created by the new Code and treasury
regulation provisions. In addition to affording a fascinating
roadmap through the maze, their article, Learning to Live with the
New Foreign Nongrantor Trust Rules, demonstrates the difficulty of
addressing legislatively the multitude of trust arrangements that
can be devised in the struggle between grantors worldwide and
the U.S. tax authorities. The article also exposes the inevitable
generation of unintended consequences, including new loopholes,
that are a product of such legislation.
In a second tax article, Respect for "Form" as "Substance" in
U.S. Taxation of International Trusts, Donald D. Kozusko and
Stephen K. Vetter address the regulatory conundrum posed by
enforcing hard-and-fast rules in the international trust context.
They argue that, in the case of transfer taxation and trust income
taxation, substance has often taken a back seat to form. Indeed,
form is substance. This reality effects the choices that are
routinely made between the utilization of one form of ownership
over another. The Code very clearly details different tax
consequences, depending on the choice of form made.
In the case of international trusts, under the new tax regime,
the jury is still out as to whether form will be submerged by
broad doctrines of economic substance and step transactions, or
whether form will still prove to be the substance of the law, more
generally characterizing the U.S. taxation regime relating to
foreign trusts. Ironically, as Kozusko and Vetter point out, the
misplaced rigor of the Code's entity attribution rules may actually
subvert the substantive goals served by formalism.
The last topic explored in this issue of the Journal is asset
protection, especially in conjunction with the international trust.
There are articles by leading proponents, including Gideon
Rothschild, Daniel S. Rubin, and Jonathan G. Blattmachr, as
well as by a leading critic, Eric Henzy, who successfully
challenged an asset protection structure in the recent decision of
In re Brooks. In addition, the transcript of a spirited Roundtable
discussion reveals the views of Barry S. Engel, one of the
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originators of asset protection strategies in response to the tort
liability "crisis." As part of this Roundtable and in a separate
article, David Aronofsky elucidates the efforts of Montana to
become a bank secrecy center.
Properly understood, the asset protection debate is about the
use by a high net worth individual of the international trust in an
offshore jurisdiction to counterbalance the risk of unbridled tort
liability in the United States. A particularly striking aspect of the
Symposium's exploration of this issue is its consideration of the
efforts of Alaska and several other jurisdictions within the United
States to attract some of the capital administered offshore. An
Alaskan asset protection trust seeks to afford the protections of
an international trust but without the dangers perceived in
placing capital in "exotic" jurisdictions offshore. However, the
viability of the effort by Alaska and several other states may be
hampered by certain constitutional constraints, most notably the
Full Faith and Credit clause as applied within the United States.
A Vanderbilt student and member of the Journal, Amy Lynn
Wagenfeld, addresses and critiques this development.
In the next issue of the Journal, the in-depth consideration of
the international trust will continue. The actual product emerging
offshore and the offshore "viewpoint" as to salient issues will be
examined in detail. Then, a number of articles will review the
efforts to gain recognition and incorporation of the trust into the
law of European civil law regimes, with particular emphasis on
Italy and the Netherlands. Recognition and/or incorporation are
crucial for the universal acceptance of the international trust as a
worldwide wealth management and disposition tool. They are also
crucial if capital managed via international trusts is to be deployed
more efficiently and predictably in the many civil law jurisdictions
worldwide.
The next issue will also consider ethical issues, money
laundering, and similar enforcement concerns. The international
trust has the potential to be subverted for criminal purposes. On
the other hand, this may be in certain cases a matter of
perspective. At least when the effort is one of minimization or
elimination of taxation and restrictions on testamentary freedom
of legitimately acquired wealth, other countries, especially capital
importers, have not been especially keen on enforcement efforts.
However, a combined, international effort may be altering this, as
developed countries fear the aggregate loss of substantial tax
revenues and control over development capital that is being
exported.
Finally, the next issue of the Journal will explore comparable
institutions in very different legal systems. As a specific basis for
comparison, the wakf of Islamic law will be considered. To the
extent it is genuinely similar to the trust, this identity may afford
1999] 527
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evidence of a more pervasive impulse to utilize certain legal
structures with generic attributes by individuals and families in
an effort to avoid state regulation of wealth. On the other hand,
the failure of the Islamic wakf to maintain significance as a
private wealth management device over time may help isolate
those peculiar attributes of the trust that have catapulted it to its
current position as the preeminent legal construct for the
management and disposition of individual and family wealth
internationally.
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum*
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; J.D., 1973, Harvard Law
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